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NTRU is one of the most widely used public-key cryptosystems and its security has been an active research topic. This paper 
proposes a new way to find NTRU-2005 private key. The algorithm is based on meet-in-the-middle attack and a quantum algo-
rithm for searching the fixed weight target. Compared with the current classical and quantum meet-in-the-middle attacks, our 
algorithm has lower time and space complexity. Moreover, this attack can also be applied against different versions of NTRU. 
The result can help to understand the security of NTRU better. 
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For all the time, how to use the quantum computational the-
ory to improve the classical cryptanalysis ability is an im-
portant issue. NTRU is a public-key cryptosystem based on 
the shortest lattice vector problem. At equivalent security 
level, NTRU needs lower memory and smaller computa-
tional complexity than RSA. Now, there is no efficient 
quantum algorithm known that will solve the shortest lattice 
vector problem. So, it is believed that NTRU is secure in 
quantum times [1]. In fact, with the rapid development of 
quantum computation, all cryptosystems based on the prob-
lems of large integer factorization and discrete logarithm are 
potentially fragile. However, it is still unclear what kind of 
effects the quantum computational theory could make on 
the security of NTRU till now.  
Classical meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a generic 
cryptanalytic method originally developed from cryptanaly-
sis of block ciphers. Recently, this technique is also found 
to be quite useful in the cryptanalysis of public-key cryp-
tography. MITM attack is the best algorithm for attacking 
NTRU at present. Grover [2] proposed a generic quantum 
search algorithm which gives a quadratic speedup over the 
classical brute-force search. However, it is not yet known 
whether Grover algorithm can speed up the classical MITM 
attack. 
There are some new developments in the classical crypt-
analysis of NTRU, such as lattice attack, hybrid attack [3], 
broadcast attack [4], etc. Ludwig [5] combined lattice re-
duction technique with Grover algorithm, and put forward a 
novel quantum attack algorithm against NTRU. However, 
the attack algorithm in [5] is not better than classical MITM 
attack. In 2011, a quantum algorithm used to find fixed 
weight target was proposed [6]. At the same time, the author 
analyzed the security of NTRU by the proposed algorithm. 
The computation complexity of Wang’s algorithm is signif-
icantly lower than a classical brute-force search, but still 
higher than a classical MITM attack.  
Xiong et al. [7] combined MITM attack with Grover 
quantum searching algorithm, and developed a quantum 
MITM attack method against NTRU. The time complexity 
in [7] is  22 1dNO C  , which is lower than the classical 
MITM attack  22dNO C N . However, the author just 
considered the quantum iterative times, and ignored all the 
complexity of classical precomputation. If considering the 
classical complexity, the complexity of MITM attack in [7] 
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is  2 22 1 2 1logd dN NO C C  , which has no any advantages com-
pared with the classical MITM attack in [8]. 
Based on the classical MITM attack and a quantum algo-
rithm to find a target solution with fixed weight, we propose 
a new quantum algorithm to attack NTRU. The time com-
plexity is only  /3 /3/3 /3logd dN NO C C             (Here, x    denotes the 
largest integer less than x ), which is lower than previous 
attacks. 
1  Preliminaries 
1.1  NTRU cryptosystem 
NTRU has been accepted as one of the standard public-key 
cryptosystem in the standard IEEE Std 1363.1. The ad-
vantage of NTRU over other cryptosystems is that encryp-
tion and decryption are very fast and the key are relatively 
small. Also the key generation is fast and easy. There have 
been several different versions of NTRU [9,10]. 
For the completeness, we give a simple description of 
NTRU key generation. Details can be found in [10]. To 
keep consistent with [6,7], we use the same notation (The 
versions in [6] is NTRU-2005). 
In NTRU, given three integers N, p, q>0, and the basic 
objects are truncated polynomials in the ring [ ] /qR x   
 1Nx  . Every element in the ring R can be represented as 
a vector or a polynomial, where multiplication is defined as 
convolution multiplication. 
There are three nonempty proper subsets: 
, ,r g FS S S R , where element 1( )rr S S d   means 
that there are d1 coefficients of one in polynomial r, and the 
rest are zero; Similarly, one can define Sg=S(d2), SF=S(d3). 
Step 1  Randomly choose gg S  and FF S , calcu-
late f=1+pF. Here we require that there exists qf R  such 
that 1(Mod )qf f q  .  
Step 2  Let (Mod )qh f g q . 
The public key of NTRU: h, p, q. 
The private key of NTRU: f. 
1.2  A classical MITM attack 
Choose an integer k, such that 2k is much larger than 22
d
NC . 
In [8], the private key f=F, and the public key h=fqg 
(Mod q); 
Let f=f1||f2, where both f1 and f2 have a length of N/2, 
containing d/2 ones, and || denote concatenation. 
(1) Enumerate f1. Put each f1 into a “bin” based on the 
most significant bits of the first k coordinates of f1h(Mod q); 
(2) Enumerate f2. Judge each f2 to see if it corresponds to 
an occupied bin. While checking for occupation, we con-
sider not only the bin given by the most significant bits of 
the first k coefficients of f2h(Mod q), but also the bins 
given by the flips of all the most significant bits which add 
1 to the corresponding coefficients of f2h(Mod q); 
(3) Search for matches. When f2 hits an occupied bin, 
take f1 from the bin. Determine whether (f1||f2)×h(Mod q) is 
binary, and if so return f=f1||f2 and terminate. Otherwise, 
proceed to the next f2. Check each one if the bin contains 
more than one f1. 
The algorithm can always return the private key f or a 




NO C N .  
1.3  Wang’s attack algorithm 
Wang et al. [6] put forward a quantum algorithm to find the 
fixed weight target, and proposed a new method to find the 
private key of NTRU. Wang’s algorithm can be considered 
as a quantum brute-force attack, which can reduce the time 
complexity from  dNO C  to  1dNO C  .  
First, Wang et al. define the label of an n-dimensional 
Boolean vector with fixed weight. 
Definition 1 [6]  Suppose that the weight of an n-dimen-     
sional Boolean vector v is w, that is, in all positions v takes 
value 0 except at positions a1, a2,...,aw with 1a1<a2<...awn. 
The label Lv of vector v is then defined as 
1 2
1 21 ... .
w
w
v a a aL C C C      
Obviously，there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
vectors and their labels.  
Moreover, 1 1
w w
w v nC L C   . The label of a target vector 
is called the target label. 
Wang’s attack procedure is as follows: 
(1) Compute the maximum value of labels 1
w
nC  , denote 
1log
w
nt C     ; 
(2) Search the t-tuple vector using Grover algorithm, de-
rive the target label; 
(3) Derive target vector from target label, return as a 
candidate private key. 
1.4  A quantum MITM Attack 
In [7], the author assumed N and d are even; The bin 
which contains polynomial fi will be labeled as label _ if , 
and bin( ) {label _ }i if f . 
The basic idea of quantum MITM attack in [7] is:  
(1) Compute all 1 1{label _ , }f f  and arrange as a table L 
indexed by 1label _ f ; 
(2) Search f2 with the Grover search algorithm, with 
1 2label _ bin( )f f , and 
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 1 2 (Mod ) {0,1}Nf f h q  ; 
(3) Search f1 correspond to 1label _ f  in L; Verify f1+f2 
with other conditions. 
In fact, the time complexity analysis in [7] is incorrect. 
Just as we mentioned before, the author ignored all the 
complexity of classical precomputation. 
2  An improved quantum MITM attack 
In NTRU-2005, the private key is f=1+2F, where polyno-
mial (or vector) F is consisting of d ones and Nd zeros.  
So, if we can find the polynomial F, the private key f can 
also been obtained easily. Here, the polynomial F can also 
be regarded as a vector. 
The basic idea of the improved algorithm 
The idea is to find the key F in the form F1||F2, where ||  
denotes concatenation. The length of F1 and F2 are 3N    
and 3N N    , respectively. Moreover, 1F  has 3d    
ones, and F2 has 3d d     ones. 
We have 
(Mod )fh g q  
 1 21 2 || (Mod )F F h g q      
1 22 2 (Mod )h F h g F h q       
   1 22 {0,1} 2 (Mod )i i ih F h F h q i        
In fact, according to lemma 1, although F itself may not 
have the property, we know that there exist some rotations 
of F which has this property and that any rotation of F will 
be effective as the private key parameters. 
Lemma 1  Let 1 2||F F F , 3N    and 3N N     
are the length of F1 and F2, respectively. Then there exists 
one rotation of F which has the property: F1 has 3d    
ones, and F2 has 3d d     ones. 
Proof  Let a, b>0. Without loss of generality, let F has 
3d a    ones in the first 3N    entries, b ones in the 
middle 3N    entries, and  / 3d d a b      ones in the 
last 2 3N N     entries. 
Then, rotating F by one position can only change the 
number of ones in the first (middle) 3N    entries by 0, 1 
or 1. There are three cases: 
In case 1, if 3b d    , then after 3N    left rotations 
each at a position, obviously; 
In case 2, if 3b d    , when finishing 3N    left ro-
tations, the first 3N    entries will have 3b d     ones 
in them. Therefore, at some points, the number of ones in 
the first 3N    entries must have been exactly 3d   ; 
Now let us look at the last case. If 3b d    , then 
 3 3d d a b d          , so after 3N N     left rota-
tions, the first 2 3N N    entries will have 
 3 3d d a b d           
ones in them, obviously.  
Let T and S denote the binary vectors which are defined 
by the most significant bits of the first k coordinates of 
1 2 (Mod )h F h q   and 2 2 (Mod ),F h q   respectively. 
Here, all F1 are of length 3N   , but we identify them 
with the length-N vectors formed by appending 3N N     
zeros. Similarly, we identify all F2 with the length-N vectors 
formed by prepending 3N    zeros. 
Algorithm 1 
(i) Choose an integer k, so that 
/3




    ; 
(ii) Calculate each F1 to get the binary vector T, and ar-
range as a table L indexed by T; 
(iii) Apply the Oracle, let F2 run over its whole sample 
space and then, search for matches by quantum algorithm in 
[6]. The proper matches meet the two conditions: 
(1) { }S T  or { }S T , where S   is given by the 
flips of some bits of S which add 1 to the corresponding 
coefficients of 2 2 (Mod )F h q  ; 
(2)  1 2|| 2 (Mod ) {0,1}Nh F F h q   ; 
(iv) Verify  1 21 2 ||f F F   with other conditions. 
Details of searching for matches in step (iii) are: 
(1) Let the label l correspond to the vector 2,lF . The Or-
acle can be defined as 














   
    ;  
(3) Initialize the quantum system, and produce the 











(4) Use Grover algorithm /22 4n  times, get the label 
l  and the vector 2,lF  correspond to the label. 
Algorithm analysis 
Let ( )O   denote the complexity of classical computation; 
Similarly, ( )O   denotes the complexity of quantum com-
putation. Furthermore, to keep consistent with [1,8], the 
time to calculate 1 2 (Mod )h F h q   is taken to be one  
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Table 1  Time and space complexity comparison for different NTRU attacks 
 C-MITM [8] Wang’s attack [6] Q-MITM [7] This paper 
Time 
/2
























log            
  














 (1)O   /2/2dNO C   /3/3    dNO C  
Table 2  Time complexity comparison for various parameters 
 C-MITM [8] Wang’s attack [6] Q-MITM [7] This paper 
Time complexity 
/2





















log            
  








NTRU251 280 286.5 291.3+242.6 261.3+257.3 
NTRU347 2112 2119.8 2124.9+259.2 283.9+279.5 
NTRU491 2160 2167.7 2173.3+283 2115.4+2111.7 
NTRU587 2192 2200 2205.7+299.2 2137.8+2132.9 
 
operation. 
According to the above process, the time and space com-
plexity of algorithm 1 depend on step (ii) and step (iii). 






   , so the time to put each 1F  
into a proper bin is  /3/3dNO C      ;  
Calculating the table L  needs  /3 /3/3 /3logd dN NO C C              
basic operation. So the expected time to run step (ii) will be 
no more than  /3 /3/3 /3logd dN NO C C             ; 
The computation complexity of step (iii) only depends on 
Grover iterative times, i.e.  /3/3 1d dN NO C       ; 
The table L needs to be saved, so the space complexity is  /3/3 1dNO C      . 
3  Comparison for different NTRU attacks 
The comparisons of results for different attacks and various 
parameters are illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2.  
Remark  Compare the two tables above, our method is 
very efficient both in the time and space complexity. 
In fact, if quantum computation is not more expensive 
than classical computation, it would be worthwhile to 
transfer some ones from the F1 side to the F2 side. In this 
case, the expected running time become approximately  
/3 /3 /3
/3 1 /3 /3log
d d d d
N N N NO C C C
          
           
     . 
4  Conclusions 
With the development of quantum computation, the security 
strength of NTRU has been an active research area in the 
past 10 years. This paper revised some errors in [7] and 
proposed an improved quantum MITM attack against NTRU. 
The time complexity in this paper is significantly reduced. 
Moreover, this attack can also be applied against NTRU- 
1998 and NTRU-2001. The result can help to understand 
the security of NTRU better. An open question worth in-
vesting would be to see if the current attacks may still be 
improved. 
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